FIRST 30 DAYS / PROPOSED
Address the starting gaps.
Expand MFA, encrypt laptops, and introduce the offboarding checklist. Confirm tooling, licensing, owners, and costs with the IT provider.
PERSONAL CASE STUDY / GOVERNANCE, RISK & COMPLIANCE
Harborview Accounting & Tax Services
I assessed three information-security risks for a fictional accounting firm, prioritized practical treatments, and translated the findings into a decision-focused summary for its owner.
01 / BUSINESS CONTEXT
The scenario is a 20-person firm serving approximately 1,400 clients, with outsourced IT support and no dedicated security staff. Its hypothetical records include tax returns, payroll information, and client identity and banking details.
I assumed a Microsoft 365 environment, cloud tax software, a shared file server, and 20 laptops. The starting gaps were limited MFA coverage, unencrypted laptops, no formal offboarding checklist, and no security-awareness training.
All organization details and figures are fictional assumptions. No real client records or production systems were examined.
02 / METHOD & PRIORITIES
I used a qualitative 5 × 5 matrix: likelihood multiplied by impact. Scores describe the assumed current state, including existing controls; they are not necessarily inherent risk. Ratings: Low 1–5, Medium 6–11, High 12–19, Critical 20–25.
| Risk | Current-state score | Proposed controls | Estimated residual target |
|---|---|---|---|
| Phishing | 4 × 4 = 16 / High | MFA, email protections, staff training, reporting procedure | 2 × 3 = 6 / Medium |
| Former employee retains access | 3 × 5 = 15 / High | Offboarding checklist, individual accounts, access reviews, least privilege | 2 × 3 = 6 / Medium |
| Lost or stolen laptop | 3 × 4 = 12 / High | Disk encryption, device management, reduced local storage, asset inventory | 3 × 2 = 6 / Medium |
Residual scores are illustrative planning estimates, conditional on effective implementation and validation. They are not measured improvements or accepted risk decisions. Any assumed impact reduction would need supporting evidence.
03 / SCENARIO ANALYSIS
A stolen password could expose client information or enable impersonation. I recommended MFA across accounts, email protections, forwarding-rule alerts, and a clear reporting process. MFA reduces password-only compromise risk but does not eliminate phishing or session theft.
Departed staff could retain access when no one owns the handoff. I proposed an office-manager-owned checklist with IT confirmation, timely account disablement, device recovery, removal of shared credentials, quarterly access reviews, and audit logging.
An unencrypted laptop could expose locally stored files. I recommended full-disk encryption, managed devices, less local data, an asset inventory, and prompt loss reporting. Encryption effectiveness depends on configuration and device state; remote wipe depends on device connectivity.
04 / TREATMENT ROADMAP
FIRST 30 DAYS / PROPOSED
Expand MFA, encrypt laptops, and introduce the offboarding checklist. Confirm tooling, licensing, owners, and costs with the IT provider.
WITHIN 90 DAYS / PROPOSED
Introduce staff training and device management, remove shared logins, and complete the first access review.
ONGOING / PROPOSED
Review access quarterly and revisit training and risk annually. Validate control performance before reassessing residual risk.
05 / OWNER SUMMARY
ILLUSTRATIVE MANAGEMENT BRIEF
All three scenarios rate High under the assumed current state. Start with account protection, laptop encryption, and reliable access removal. These actions address identifiable gaps while the firm builds a repeatable security process.
Decision requested in the exercise: approve the proposed 30-day priorities, assign accountable owners, and have the IT provider confirm feasibility and budget.
Suggested responsibilities: office manager for the offboarding process; IT provider for MFA and device encryption; owner for prioritization and risk decisions.
Projected Medium ratings are targets to validate, not guaranteed outcomes. Approval, implementation, and risk acceptance have not occurred in this fictional scenario.
This project demonstrates risk reasoning and communication through an assessment and owner summary. It is a focused exercise, not a full security audit or compliance determination. Backups, broader ransomware exposure, vendor risk, and physical security require additional assessment.
In a real engagement, my next steps would be stakeholder interviews, inventory and configuration evidence, validated costs, explicit control mappings, and a treatment register with named owners and due dates.