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THIRD-PARTY RISK MANAGEMENT + VULNERABILITY INTELLIGENCE

Third-Party Risk
& Vulnerability Monitor

Built a third-party risk workspace that follows a vendor through its lifecycle: tier it, assess it against NIST CSF 2.0, ISO 27001, and SOC 2, review its assurance report, settle contract terms, record risk against an appetite threshold, and monitor it. Real CISA KEV, NVD, and EPSS data feeds the monitoring step and can reopen a vendor review. The organization and vendor responses are fictional.

  • Fictional organization and vendor responses
  • Illustrative scoring, not a vendor rating
  • Public vulnerability data is real
Third-party riskNIST CSF 2.0 GV.SCISO 27001:2022SOC 2 reviewRisk registerCISA KEV / NVD / EPSSPythonJavaScript
Open the risk monitor ↗

Seven vendors: five with real public product identities and two fully fictional ones (with a ready-made sample assessment). A 32-question assessment, SOC 2 review worksheet, contract checklist, and risk register. Business context and every response are fictional; no private company data is used.

TIER → ASSESS → DECIDE → MONITOR
  1. 01 / TIERMatch scrutiny to risk

    Data, access, criticality, and replaceability set depth and reassessment cadence

  2. 02 / ASSESSEvidence, mapped to frameworks

    Questionnaire, SOC 2 reliance rules, and contract terms

  3. 03 / DECIDE & MONITOROwn the residual risk

    Appetite, executive acceptance, and public KEV signals that reopen reviews

PROJECT APPROACH

Third-party risk is a lifecycle.

Tiering. Each vendor is scored on data sensitivity, system access, business criticality, and how hard it is to replace. Regulated data or a critical function forces Tier 1 whatever the score. The tier decides which questions apply, whether a SOC 2 or equivalent report is required, and how often to reassess (12, 24, or 36 months).

Assessment. Thirty-two questions across eight domains, each tagged with the NIST CSF 2.0, ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A, and SOC 2 references it supports. Answering Yes requires an evidence reference; gaps require notes. The SOC 2 worksheet applies explicit reliance rules: the auditor opinion, report age, exceptions, user-entity controls, subservice carve-outs, and the bridge-letter gap decide between rely, rely with conditions, and do not rely.

Risk register. Gaps become risks scored likelihood × impact before and after controls. A residual score of 10 or more is above appetite and must be accepted by an executive risk owner; accepting a Critical risk expires after six months. Residual risk cannot exceed inherent risk, and any reduction must be explained.

Monitoring. The CISA KEV, NVD, and EPSS pipeline from the first version remains: a confirmed-affected known-exploited vulnerability, or an unvalidated one on a Tier 1 vendor, becomes a reassessment trigger. Those findings can be added to the register. There is no continuous background monitoring, and a product-name match is a candidate, not a confirmed exposure.

Boundaries. Control coverage reflects the answers entered in this exercise and is not a vendor rating. Framework mappings are for orientation, not a compliance determination. Storage is optional and unencrypted; use fictional notes only.

Try it: open Northwind Payroll Services, load the illustrative sample, and look at the SOC 2 conclusion, the gaps, and the register. Then open any real-product vendor, tier it, answer a few questions, and add a gap to the risk register.